Hadi Hosseini
24 papers · 2019–2026 · 3 venues · across top CS/AI venues
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Achievements
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πΊοΈ Taxonomy Completionist (24) π Academic Marathon Β· Sprint π Conference Polyglot Β· Bronze π Interdisciplinary Bridge Β· Bronze π£ Hot Topic Early Bird
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Deep Specialist
(10)
π§¬
Topic Evolution
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Keyword Champion
(5)
ποΈ
Keyword Collector
(92)
β‘
Prolific Year Β· Productive
π₯
Unstoppable Β· Bronze
π
Century Club Β· Bronze
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Conference Pioneer
Venues
Top co-authors
Research topics
Keywords
fair division
(8)
mechanism design
(6)
stable matching
(5)
game theory
(4)
maximin share
(4)
multi-agent system
(4)
pareto optimality
(4)
resource allocation
(4)
matching market
(3)
deferred acceptance
(3)
approximation algorithm
(3)
collective decision making
(2)
envy-freeness up to one item
(2)
preference learning
(2)
lexicographic preference
(2)
deferred acceptance algorithm
(2)
ground truth recovery
(2)
strategic behavior
(2)
sample complexity
(2)
preference aggregation
(2)
Papers
Fair Societies: Algorithms for House Allocations
AAAI 2026
Non-Monotonicity in Fair Division of Graphs
AAAI 2026
MatchXplain: Analyzing Preferences, Explaining Outcomes, and Simplifying Decisions
IJCAI 2025
Strategyproof Matching of Roommates and Rooms
AAAI 2025
Algorithmic Fairness in Distribution of Resources and Tasks
IJCAI 2024
Fair Distribution of Delivery Orders
IJCAI 2024
Putting Gale & Shapley to Work: Guaranteeing Stability Through Learning
NeurIPS 2024
Strategic Aspects of Stable Matching Markets: A Survey
IJCAI 2024
The Fairness Fair: Bringing Human Perception into Collective Decision-Making
AAAI 2024
The Surprising Effectiveness of SP Voting with Partial Preferences
NeurIPS 2024
Class Fairness in Online Matching
AAAI 2023
Fairly Allocating Goods and (Terrible) Chores
IJCAI 2023
Ordinal Maximin Share Approximation for Goods (Extended Abstract)
IJCAI 2023
Two for One & One for All: Two-Sided Manipulation in Matching Markets
IJCAI 2022
Accomplice Manipulation of the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm
IJCAI 2021
Fair and Efficient Allocations under Lexicographic Preferences
AAAI 2021
Fair Stable Matchings Under Correlated Preferences (Student Abstract)
AAAI 2021
Guaranteeing Maximin Shares: Some Agents Left Behind
IJCAI 2021
Necessarily Optimal One-Sided Matchings
AAAI 2021
Surprisingly Popular Voting Recovers Rankings, Surprisingly!
IJCAI 2021
Fair Division of Time: Multi-layered Cake Cutting
IJCAI 2020
Fair Division Through Information Withholding
AAAI 2020
Fairness Does Not Imply Satisfaction (Student Abstract)
AAAI 2020
Partners in Crime: Manipulating the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm through an Accomplice
AAAI 2019