The Strange Role of Information Asymmetry in Auctions—Does More Accurate Value Estimation Benefit a Bidder?

Abstract We study the second-price auction in which bidders have asymmetric information regarding the item’s value. Each bidder’s value for the item depends on a private component and a public component. While each bidder observes their own private component, they hold different and asymmetric information about the public component. We characterize the equilibrium of this auction game and study how the asymmetric bidder information affects their equilibrium bidding strategies. We also discover multiple surprisingly counter-intuitive equilibrium phenomena. For instance, a bidder may be better off if she is less informed regarding the public component. Conversely, a bidder may sometimes be worse off if she obtains more accurate estimation about the auctioned item. Our results suggest that efforts devoted by bidders to improve their value estimations, as widely seen in today’s online advertising auctions, may not always be to their benefit.