Papers
Deep Bayesian Trust: A Dominant and Fair Incentive Mechanism for Crowd
Naman Goel, Boi Faltings
Pareto Efficient Auctions with Interest Rates
Gagan Goel, Vahab Mirrokni, Renato Paes Leme
On the Distortion Value of the Elections with Abstention
Mohammad Ghodsi, Mohamad Latifian, Masoud Seddighin
Multi-Unit Bilateral Trade
Matthias Gerstgrasser, Paul W. Goldberg, Bart de Keijzer et al.
Fair and Efficient Memory Sharing: Confronting Free Riders
Eric J. Friedman, Vasilis Gkatzelis, Christos-Alexandros Psomas et al.
An Equivalence between Wagering and Fair-Division Mechanisms
Rupert Freeman, David M. Pennock, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan
A Bridge between Liquid and Social Welfare in Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Bidders
Dimitris Fotakis, Kyriakos Lotidis, Chara Podimata
Fair Knapsack
Till Fluschnik, Piotr Skowron, Mervin Triphaus et al.
Very Hard Electoral Control Problems
Zack Fitzsimmons, Edith Hemaspaandra, Alexander Hoover et al.
An Improved Quasi-Polynomial Algorithm for Approximate Well-Supported Nash Equilibria
Michail Fasoulakis, Evangelos Markakis
Online Convex Optimization for Sequential Decision Processes and Extensive-Form Games
Gabriele Farina, Christian Kroer, Tuomas Sandholm
How Similar Are Two Elections?
Piotr Faliszewski, Piotr Skowron, Arkadii Slinko et al.
Approximation and Hardness of Shift-Bribery
Piotr Faliszewski, Pasin Manurangsi, Krzysztof Sornat
Random Dictators with a Random Referee: Constant Sample Complexity Mechanisms for Social Choice
Brandon Fain, Ashish Goel, Kamesh Munagala et al.
Online Pandora’s Boxes and Bandits
Hossein Esfandiari, MohammadTaghi HajiAghayi, Brendan Lucier et al.
Balancing Relevance and Diversity in Online Bipartite Matching via Submodularity
John P. Dickerson, Karthik Abinav Sankararaman, Aravind Srinivasan et al.
On the Complexity of the Inverse Semivalue Problem for Weighted Voting Games
Ilias Diakonikolas, Chrystalla Pavlou
Solving Large Extensive-Form Games with Strategy Constraints
Trevor Davis, Kevin Waugh, Michael Bowling
Group Fairness for the Allocation of Indivisible Goods
Vincent Conitzer, Rupert Freeman, Nisarg Shah et al.
Randomized Wagering Mechanisms
Yiling Chen, Yang Liu, Juntao Wang
Partial Verification as a Substitute for Money
Sofia Ceppi, Ian Kash, Rafael Frongillo
Solving Imperfect-Information Games via Discounted Regret Minimization
Noam Brown, Tuomas Sandholm
Fast Iterative Combinatorial Auctions via Bayesian Learning
Gianluca Brero, Sébastien Lahaie, Sven Seuken
Walrasian Dynamics in Multi-Unit Markets
Simina Brânzei, Aris Filos-Ratsikas
Primarily about Primaries
Allan Borodin, Omer Lev, Nisarg Shah et al.