Papers
Implicitly Aligning Humans and Autonomous Agents through Shared Task Abstractions
Stéphane Aroca-Ouellette, Miguel Aroca-Ouellette, Katharina von der Wense et al.
Public Signaling in Markets with Information Asymmetry Using a Limited Number of Signals
Xu Zhao, Ren Liu, Weiran Shen
Revisiting Proportional Allocation with Subsidy: Simplification and Improvements
Xiaowei Wu, Quan Xue, Shengwei Zhou
A Little Subsidy Ensures MMS Allocation for Three Agents
Xiaowei Wu, Quan Xue, Shengwei Zhou
Probabilistic Analysis of Stable Matching in Large Markets with Siblings
Zhaohong Sun, Tomohiko Yokoyama, Makoto Yokoo
Improved MMS Approximations for Few Agent Types
Parnian Shahkar, Jugal Garg
Finding Possible Winners in Spatial Voting with Incomplete Information
Hadas Shachnai, Rotem Shavitt, Andreas Wiese
Discrete Budget Aggregation: Truthfulness and Proportionality
Ulrike Schmidt-Kraepelin, Warut Suksompong, Markus Utke
Improved Approximation Ratio for Strategyproof Facility Location on a Cycle
Krzysztof Rogowski, Marcin Dziubiński
Optimal Capacity Modification for Stable Matchings with Ties
Keshav Ranjan, Meghana Nasre, Prajakta Nimbhorkar
Variety-Seeking Jump Games on Graphs
Lata Narayanan, Jaroslav Opatrny, Shanmukha Tummala et al.
Joint-Perturbation Simultaneous Pseudo-Gradient
Carlos Martin, Tuomas Sandholm
Asymptotic Fair Division: Chores Are Easier Than Goods
Pasin Manurangsi, Warut Suksompong
Asymptotic Analysis of Weighted Fair Division
Pasin Manurangsi, Warut Suksompong, Tomohiko Yokoyama
Viral Marketing and Convergence Properties in Generalised Voter Model
Abhiram Manohara, Ahad N. Zehmakan
Stackelberg vs. Nash in the Lottery Colonel Blotto Game
Yan Liu, Bonan Ni, Weiran Shen et al.
Approximately EFX and fPO Allocations for Bivalued Chores
Zehan Lin, Xiaowei Wu, Shengwei Zhou
Logarithmic Approximations for Fair k-Set Selection
Shi Li, Chenyang Xu, Ruilong Zhang
Fair Submodular Maximization over a Knapsack Constraint
Lijun Li, Chenyang Xu, Liuyi Yang et al.
Online Housing Market
Julien Lesca
Efficient Algorithms for Electing Successive Committees
Pallavi Jain, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk
Dividing Conflicting Items Fairly
Ayumi Igarashi, Pasin Manurangsi, Hirotaka Yoneda
The Proportional Veto Principle for Approval Ballots
Daniel Halpern, Ariel D. Procaccia, Warut Suksompong
More Efforts Towards Fixed-Parameter Approximability of Multiwinner Rules
Sushmita Gupta, Pallavi Jain, Souvik Saha et al.