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Game Theory

1,046 papers

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Papers

Bandit Linear Optimization for Sequential Decision Making and Extensive-Form Games AAAI 2021 Bayesian Persuasion under Ex Ante and Ex Post Constraints AAAI 2021 Best-Effort Synthesis: Doing Your Best Is Not Harder Than Giving Up IJCAI 2021 Beyond Bandit Feedback in Online Multiclass Classification NeurIPS 2021 Bounded Risk-Sensitive Markov Games: Forward Policy Design and Inverse Reward Learning with Iterative Reasoning and Cumulative Prospect Theory AAAI 2021 Budget-Constrained Coalition Strategies with Discounting IJCAI 2021 Budget Feasible Mechanisms Over Graphs AAAI 2021 Classification with Few Tests through Self-Selection AAAI 2021 Computational Analyses of the Electoral College: Campaigning Is Hard But Approximately Manageable AAAI 2021 Computing Ex Ante Coordinated Team-Maxmin Equilibria in Zero-Sum Multiplayer Extensive-Form Games AAAI 2021 Computing Quantal Stackelberg Equilibrium in Extensive-Form Games AAAI 2021 Computing the Proportional Veto Core AAAI 2021 Condorcet Relaxation In Spatial Voting AAAI 2021 Connecting Optimal Ex-Ante Collusion in Teams to Extensive-Form Correlation: Faster Algorithms and Positive Complexity Results ICML 2021 Convergence Analysis of No-Regret Bidding Algorithms in Repeated Auctions AAAI 2021 Coupon Design in Advertising Systems AAAI 2021 Decentralized Learning in Online Queuing Systems NeurIPS 2021 Decentralized No-regret Learning Algorithms for Extensive-form Correlated Equilibria (Extended Abstract) IJCAI 2021 Dependency Stochastic Boolean Satisfiability: A Logical Formalism for NEXPTIME Decision Problems with Uncertainty AAAI 2021 Dividing a Graphical Cake AAAI 2021 Efficient Truthful Scheduling and Resource Allocation through Monitoring AAAI 2021 Emergent Prosociality in Multi-Agent Games Through Gifting IJCAI 2021 Emerging Methods of Auction Design in Social Networks IJCAI 2021 Epsilon Best Arm Identification in Spectral Bandits IJCAI 2021 Equitable and Optimal Transport with Multiple Agents AISTATS 2021