Game Theory

Regret-Minimizing Double Oracle for Extensive-Form Games ICML 2023 Rethinking Safe Control in the Presence of Self-Seeking Humans AAAI 2023 Reward-Based Negotiating Agent Strategies AAAI 2023 Securing Lifelines: Safe Delivery of Critical Services in Areas with Volatile Security Situation via a Stackelberg Game Approach AAAI 2023 Similarity-based cooperative equilibrium NeurIPS 2023 Socially Optimal Non-discriminatory Restrictions for Continuous-Action Games AAAI 2023 Solving Large-Scale Pursuit-Evasion Games Using Pre-trained Strategies AAAI 2023 So many design choices: Improving and interpreting neural agent communication in signaling games ACL 2023 STay-ON-the-Ridge: Guaranteed Convergence to Local Minimax Equilibrium in Nonconvex-Nonconcave Games COLT 2023 Strategic Behavior in Two-sided Matching Markets with Prediction-enhanced Preference-formation NeurIPS 2023 Strategic Classification under Unknown Personalized Manipulation NeurIPS 2023 Strategic Classification with Unknown User Manipulations ICML 2023 Strategic Facility Location with Clients That Minimize Total Waiting Time AAAI 2023 Strategyproofness and Proportionality in Party-Approval Multiwinner Elections AAAI 2023 Strategyproof Voting under Correlated Beliefs NeurIPS 2023 Team Belief DAG: Generalizing the Sequence Form to Team Games for Fast Computation of Correlated Team Max-Min Equilibria via Regret Minimization ICML 2023 The Complexity of Markov Equilibrium in Stochastic Games COLT 2023 The Power of Regularization in Solving Extensive-Form Games ICLR 2023 Towards Characterizing the First-order Query Complexity of Learning (Approximate) Nash Equilibria in Zero-sum Matrix Games NeurIPS 2023 Towards convergence to Nash equilibria in two-team zero-sum games ICLR 2023 Truthful Mechanisms for Steiner Tree Problems AAAI 2023 Truthful Self-Play ICLR 2023 Uncoupled and Convergent Learning in Two-Player Zero-Sum Markov Games with Bandit Feedback NeurIPS 2023 Universal Agent Mixtures and the Geometry of Intelligence AISTATS 2023 Utility Maximizer or Value Maximizer: Mechanism Design for Mixed Bidders in Online Advertising AAAI 2023