strategic behavior

Automated Human Strategic Behavior Modeling via Large Language Models AAAI 2026 Promises Made, Promises Kept: Safe Pareto Improvements via Ex Post Verifiable Commitments AAAI 2026 Beyond Self-Interest: How Group Strategies Reshape Content Creation in Recommendation Platforms? ICML 2025 Improving Cooperation in Language Games with Bayesian Inference and the Cognitive Hierarchy AAAI 2025 Performative Prediction on Games and Mechanism Design AISTATS 2025 Private Blotto: Viewpoint Competition with Polarized Agents AAAI 2025 Budget Feasible Mechanisms: A Survey IJCAI 2024 Competition among Pairwise Lottery Contests AAAI 2024 Data-Driven Knowledge-Aware Inference of Private Information in Continuous Double Auctions AAAI 2024 Dynamic Service Fee Pricing under Strategic Behavior: Actions as Instruments and Phase Transition NeurIPS 2024 Mechanisms That Play a Game, Not Toss a Coin IJCAI 2024 Strategic Multi-Armed Bandit Problems Under Debt-Free Reporting NeurIPS 2024 Strategic Usage in a Multi-Learner Setting AISTATS 2024 Two-Sided Facility Location Games IJCAI 2024 Better Peer Grading through Bayesian Inference AAAI 2023 Convergence in Multi-Issue Iterative Voting under Uncertainty IJCAI 2023 Moral Machine or Tyranny of the Majority? AAAI 2023 Rethinking Safe Control in the Presence of Self-Seeking Humans AAAI 2023 Strategic Behavior in Two-sided Matching Markets with Prediction-enhanced Preference-formation NeurIPS 2023 Strategic Distribution Shift of Interacting Agents via Coupled Gradient Flows NeurIPS 2023 How and Why to Manipulate Your Own Agent: On the Incentives of Users of Learning Agents NeurIPS 2022 Strategic Instrumental Variable Regression: Recovering Causal Relationships From Strategic Responses ICML 2022 Two for One & One for All: Two-Sided Manipulation in Matching Markets IJCAI 2022 Accomplice Manipulation of the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm IJCAI 2021 Linear Models are Robust Optimal Under Strategic Behavior AISTATS 2021