mechanism design

Breaking Barriers, Finding Boundaries: Not Obviously Manipulable Budget-Feasible Mechanism Design AAAI 2026 Compensate to Not Deviate: On Subsidised Equilibria AAAI 2026 Designing Incentives for Networked Multi-agent Systems AAAI 2026 Economics of Content Creation with Generative AI AAAI 2026 Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods with Variable Groups AAAI 2026 Fair Diffusion Auctions AAAI 2026 Information Elicitation Mechanisms for Bayesian Auctions (Abstract Reprint) AAAI 2026 MechaFormer: Sequence Learning for Kinematic Mechanism Design Automation AAAI 2026 Minimizing Inequity in Facility Location Games AAAI 2026 Multi-District School Choice: Playing on Several Fields AAAI 2026 Optimally Auditing Adversarial Agents AAAI 2026 Position Fair Mechanisms Allocating Indivisible Goods AAAI 2026 Quota Marketplace: Dynamic Pricing for Efficient Allocation of ML Training Resources OSDI 2026 Responsible Mechanism Design AAAI 2026 Testing Under Strategic Manipulation: Mechanism Design for Human and AI Institutions AAAI 2026 Weakest Bidder Types and New Core-Selecting Combinatorial Auctions AAAI 2026 Beyond Monotonicity: On the Convergence of Learning Algorithms in Standard Auction Games AAAI 2025 Computing Perfect Bayesian Equilibria in Sequential Auctions with Verification AAAI 2025 Constant-Factor Distortion Mechanisms for k-Committee Election AAAI 2025 Constrained Serial Dictatorships Can Be Fair IJCAI 2025 Discrete Budget Aggregation: Truthfulness and Proportionality IJCAI 2025 Distance Preservation Games IJCAI 2025 Equitable Mechanism Design for Facility Location IJCAI 2025 Every Bit Helps: Achieving the Optimal Distortion with a Few Queries AAAI 2025 Forecasting Competitions with Correlated Events AAAI 2025