incentive compatibility

Fair Diffusion Auctions AAAI 2026 Weakest Bidder Types and New Core-Selecting Combinatorial Auctions AAAI 2026 Forecasting Competitions with Correlated Events AAAI 2025 Hedging and Approximate Truthfulness in Traditional Forecasting Competitions AAAI 2025 Learning to Negotiate via Voluntary Commitment AISTATS 2025 Merging Mechanisms for Ads and Organic Items in E-commerce Platforms AAAI 2025 Non-Monetary Mechanism Design without Distributional Information: Using Scarce Audits Wisely (Extended Abstract) COLT 2025 On Designing the Optimal Integrated Ad Auction in E-commerce Platforms AAAI 2025 On the Power of Randomization for Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms AAAI 2025 Optimal Auction Design for Mixed Bidders AAAI 2025 Optimal Auction Design in the Joint Advertising ICML 2025 Ad Auctions for LLMs via Retrieval Augmented Generation NeurIPS 2024 Budget Feasible Mechanisms: A Survey IJCAI 2024 Double Auction on Diffusion Network AAAI 2024 Eliciting Honest Information from Authors Using Sequential Review AAAI 2024 Improved Bandits in Many-to-One Matching Markets with Incentive Compatibility AAAI 2024 Incentivized Truthful Communication for Federated Bandits ICLR 2024 Non-excludable Bilateral Trade between Groups AAAI 2024 Online Information Acquisition: Hiring Multiple Agents ICLR 2024 On the price of exact truthfulness in incentive-compatible online learning with bandit feedback: a regret lower bound for WSU-UX AISTATS 2024 Optimal Auction Design with User Coupons in Advertising Systems IJCAI 2024 Optimal Mechanism in a Dynamic Stochastic Knapsack Environment AAAI 2024 Peer Neighborhood Mechanisms: A Framework for Mechanism Generalization AAAI 2024 Simultaneous Optimization of Bid Shading and Internal Auction for Demand-Side Platforms AAAI 2024 Truthful High Dimensional Sparse Linear Regression NeurIPS 2024