conftrace_

incentive compatibility

90 papers

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Also known as

IC

Co-occurring keywords

mechanism design (340) game theory (854) auction design (31) revenue optimization (63) regret bound (1926) differential privacy (1016) revenue maximization (37) neural network (6616) approximation algorithm (630) auction mechanism (31)

Papers

Weakest Bidder Types and New Core-Selecting Combinatorial Auctions AAAI 2026
Fair Diffusion Auctions AAAI 2026
Hedging and Approximate Truthfulness in Traditional Forecasting Competitions AAAI 2025
Forecasting Competitions with Correlated Events AAAI 2025
On Designing the Optimal Integrated Ad Auction in E-commerce Platforms AAAI 2025
Optimal Auction Design for Mixed Bidders AAAI 2025
On the Power of Randomization for Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms AAAI 2025
Merging Mechanisms for Ads and Organic Items in E-commerce Platforms AAAI 2025
Eliciting Honest Information from Authors Using Sequential Review AAAI 2024
On the price of exact truthfulness in incentive-compatible online learning with bandit feedback: a regret lower bound for WSU-UX AISTATS 2024
Non-excludable Bilateral Trade between Groups AAAI 2024
Optimal Auction Design with User Coupons in Advertising Systems IJCAI 2024
Improved Bandits in Many-to-One Matching Markets with Incentive Compatibility AAAI 2024
Budget Feasible Mechanisms: A Survey IJCAI 2024
Double Auction on Diffusion Network AAAI 2024
Simultaneous Optimization of Bid Shading and Internal Auction for Demand-Side Platforms AAAI 2024
Optimal Mechanism in a Dynamic Stochastic Knapsack Environment AAAI 2024
Peer Neighborhood Mechanisms: A Framework for Mechanism Generalization AAAI 2024
Ad Auctions for LLMs via Retrieval Augmented Generation NIPS 2024
Truthful High Dimensional Sparse Linear Regression NIPS 2024
Vulnerabilities of Single-Round Incentive Compatibility in Auto-bidding: Theory and Evidence from ROI-Constrained Online Advertising Markets IJCAI 2024
Task Allocation on Networks with Execution Uncertainty (Extended Abstract)∗ IJCAI 2023
Online Mechanism Design for Information Acquisition ICML 2023
Revenue Maximization Mechanisms for an Uninformed Mediator with Communication Abilities IJCAI 2023
Learning Efficient Truthful Mechanisms for Trading Networks IJCAI 2023