conftrace_

incentive compatibility

90 papers

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Also known as

IC

Co-occurring keywords

mechanism design (340) game theory (854) auction design (31) revenue optimization (63) regret bound (1926) differential privacy (1016) revenue maximization (37) neural network (6616) approximation algorithm (630) auction mechanism (31)

Papers

Task Allocation on Networks with Execution Uncertainty (Extended Abstract)∗ IJCAI 2023
Incentive-Compatible Selection for One or Two Influentials IJCAI 2023
Revenue Maximization Mechanisms for an Uninformed Mediator with Communication Abilities IJCAI 2023
No-Regret Online Prediction with Strategic Experts NIPS 2023
Function Approximation for Solving Stackelberg Equilibrium in Large Perfect Information Games AAAI 2023
Incentivising Diffusion while Preserving Differential Privacy UAI 2023
Characterization of Incentive Compatibility of an Ex-ante Constrained Player AAAI 2022
Multi-Unit Auction in Social Networks with Budgets AAAI 2022
Strictly Proper Contract Functions Can Be Arbitrage-Free AAAI 2022
A Context-Integrated Transformer-Based Neural Network for Auction Design ICML 2022
Benefits of Permutation-Equivariance in Auction Mechanisms NIPS 2022
Online Allocation and Learning in the Presence of Strategic Agents NIPS 2022
Bayesian Persuasion for Algorithmic Recourse NIPS 2022
Optimal-er Auctions through Attention NIPS 2022
Sequential Blocked Matching AAAI 2022
An $\alpha$-regret analysis of Adversarial Bilateral Trade NIPS 2022
Heterogeneous Facility Location with Limited Resources AAAI 2022
Learning Strategies in Decentralized Matching Markets under Uncertain Preferences JMLR 2021
Incentive-Aware PAC Learning AAAI 2021
Classification with Strategically Withheld Data AAAI 2021
You Are the Best Reviewer of Your Own Papers: An Owner-Assisted Scoring Mechanism NIPS 2021
Shortlisting Rules and Incentives in an End-to-End Model for Participatory Budgeting IJCAI 2021
Sample Elicitation AISTATS 2021
Revenue-Incentive Tradeoffs in Dynamic Reserve Pricing ICML 2021
A Polynomial-time, Truthful, Individually Rational and Budget Balanced Ridesharing Mechanism IJCAI 2021