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incentive compatibility

96 papers

IC

Papers

Vulnerabilities of Single-Round Incentive Compatibility in Auto-bidding: Theory and Evidence from ROI-Constrained Online Advertising Markets IJCAI 2024 Deep Contract Design via Discontinuous Networks NeurIPS 2023 Function Approximation for Solving Stackelberg Equilibrium in Large Perfect Information Games AAAI 2023 Incentive-Compatible Selection for One or Two Influentials IJCAI 2023 Incentivising Diffusion while Preserving Differential Privacy UAI 2023 Learning Efficient Truthful Mechanisms for Trading Networks IJCAI 2023 Non-Obvious Manipulability in Extensive-Form Mechanisms: The Revelation Principle for Single-Parameter Agents IJCAI 2023 No-Regret Online Prediction with Strategic Experts NeurIPS 2023 Online Mechanism Design for Information Acquisition ICML 2023 Revenue Maximization Mechanisms for an Uninformed Mediator with Communication Abilities IJCAI 2023 Task Allocation on Networks with Execution Uncertainty (Extended Abstract)∗ IJCAI 2023 A Context-Integrated Transformer-Based Neural Network for Auction Design ICML 2022 An α-regret analysis of Adversarial Bilateral Trade NeurIPS 2022 Bayesian Persuasion for Algorithmic Recourse NeurIPS 2022 Benefits of Permutation-Equivariance in Auction Mechanisms NeurIPS 2022 Characterization of Incentive Compatibility of an Ex-ante Constrained Player AAAI 2022 Heterogeneous Facility Location with Limited Resources AAAI 2022 Multi-Unit Auction in Social Networks with Budgets AAAI 2022 Online Allocation and Learning in the Presence of Strategic Agents NeurIPS 2022 Optimal-er Auctions through Attention NeurIPS 2022 Sequential Blocked Matching AAAI 2022 Strictly Proper Contract Functions Can Be Arbitrage-Free AAAI 2022 A Permutation-Equivariant Neural Network Architecture For Auction Design AAAI 2021 A Polynomial-time, Truthful, Individually Rational and Budget Balanced Ridesharing Mechanism IJCAI 2021 Bandit Learning in Decentralized Matching Markets JMLR 2021