conftrace_

revenue optimization

63 papers

Explore in graph

Co-occurring keywords

mechanism design (340) auction design (31) incentive compatibility (90) auction theory (41) game theory (854) online learning (1777) auction mechanism (31) regret bound (1926) revenue maximization (37) strategic buyer (12)

Papers

SACO: Sequence-Aware Constrained Optimization Framework for Coupon Distribution in E-commerce AAAI 2026
Matching Policy Design for Gig Platforms with “Priority” Features AAAI 2026
Weakest Bidder Types and New Core-Selecting Combinatorial Auctions AAAI 2026
Learning Optimal Auctions with Correlated Value Distributions AAAI 2025
Braess’s Paradox of Generative AI AAAI 2025
Increasing Revenue in Efficient Combinatorial Auctions by Learning to Generate Artificial Competition AAAI 2025
Randomized Learning-Augmented Auctions with Revenue Guarantees IJCAI 2024
Fair Allocation in Dynamic Mechanism Design NIPS 2024
Strategic Recommendation: Revenue Optimal Matching for Online Platforms (Student Abstract) AAAI 2024
Randomized Truthful Auctions with Learning Agents NIPS 2024
Learning to Price Homogeneous Data NIPS 2024
Online Pricing for Multi-User Multi-Item Markets NIPS 2023
Data Market Design through Deep Learning NIPS 2023
On the Robustness of Mechanism Design under Total Variation Distance NIPS 2023
Bicriteria Multidimensional Mechanism Design with Side Information NIPS 2023
Optimal Pricing Schemes for Identical Items with Time-Sensitive Buyers AAAI 2023
Pricing against a Budget and ROI Constrained Buyer AISTATS 2023
Learning Revenue Maximization Using Posted Prices for Stochastic Strategic Patient Buyers AAAI 2023
Maximizing Revenue under Market Shrinkage and Market Uncertainty NIPS 2022
A Context-Integrated Transformer-Based Neural Network for Auction Design ICML 2022
Bayesian Auctions with Efficient Queries (Extended Abstract) IJCAI 2022
Optimal-er Auctions through Attention NIPS 2022
Dynamic Car Dispatching and Pricing: Revenue and Fairness for Ridesharing Platforms IJCAI 2022
Public Signaling in Bayesian Ad Auctions IJCAI 2022
On Infinite Separations Between Simple and Optimal Mechanisms NIPS 2022