auction theory

Merging Mechanisms for Ads and Organic Items in E-commerce Platforms AAAI 2025 Non-excludable Bilateral Trade between Groups AAAI 2024 Randomized Truthful Auctions with Learning Agents NeurIPS 2024 Sample Complexity of Posted Pricing for a Single Item NeurIPS 2024 Stakeholder-oriented Decision Support for Auction-based Federated Learning IJCAI 2024 Vulnerabilities of Single-Round Incentive Compatibility in Auto-bidding: Theory and Evidence from ROI-Constrained Online Advertising Markets IJCAI 2024 Auto-bidding with Budget and ROI Constrained Buyers IJCAI 2023 Blending Advertising with Organic Content in E-commerce via Virtual Bids AAAI 2023 Refined Mechanism Design for Approximately Structured Priors via Active Regression NeurIPS 2023 Revenue Maximization Mechanisms for an Uninformed Mediator with Communication Abilities IJCAI 2023 Utility Maximizer or Value Maximizer: Mechanism Design for Mixed Bidders in Online Advertising AAAI 2023 An Algorithmic Theory of Markets and Their Application to Decentralized Markets AAAI 2022 Learning NP-Hard Multi-Agent Assignment Planning using GNN: Inference on a Random Graph and Provable Auction-Fitted Q-learning NeurIPS 2022 Learning Revenue-Maximizing Auctions With Differentiable Matching AISTATS 2022 Leveraging the Hints: Adaptive Bidding in Repeated First-Price Auctions NeurIPS 2022 On Infinite Separations Between Simple and Optimal Mechanisms NeurIPS 2022 Simple Mechanisms for Welfare Maximization in Rich Advertising Auctions NeurIPS 2022 The Strange Role of Information Asymmetry in Auctions—Does More Accurate Value Estimation Benefit a Bidder? AAAI 2022 Coupon Design in Advertising Systems AAAI 2021 Generalizing Complex Hypotheses on Product Distributions: Auctions, Prophet Inequalities, and Pandora’s Problem COLT 2021 PoA of Simple Auctions with Interdependent Values AAAI 2021 Prior-independent Dynamic Auctions for a Value-maximizing Buyer NeurIPS 2021 Revenue-Incentive Tradeoffs in Dynamic Reserve Pricing ICML 2021 Revenue maximization via machine learning with noisy data NeurIPS 2021 Simultaneous 2nd Price Item Auctions with No-Underbidding AAAI 2021