mechanism design

Hedging and Approximate Truthfulness in Traditional Forecasting Competitions AAAI 2025 Improved Approximation Ratio for Strategyproof Facility Location on a Cycle IJCAI 2025 Incentives for Early Arrival in Cooperative Games (Extended Abstract) IJCAI 2025 Learning Optimal Auctions with Correlated Value Distributions AAAI 2025 Mechanism Design for Connecting Regions Under Disruptions AAAI 2025 Mechanism Design for Large Language Models (Extended Abstract) IJCAI 2025 Merging Mechanisms for Ads and Organic Items in E-commerce Platforms AAAI 2025 Metric Distortion of Line-up Elections: The Right Person for the Right Job AAAI 2025 Non-Obvious Manipulability in Additively Separable and Fractional Hedonic Games IJCAI 2025 On Designing the Optimal Integrated Ad Auction in E-commerce Platforms AAAI 2025 Online Housing Market IJCAI 2025 Online Resource Sharing: Better Robust Guarantees via Randomized Strategies IJCAI 2025 On the Power of Randomization for Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms AAAI 2025 Optimal Auction Design for Mixed Bidders AAAI 2025 Paid with Models: Optimal Contract Design for Collaborative Machine Learning AAAI 2025 Performative Prediction on Games and Mechanism Design AISTATS 2025 Private Blotto: Viewpoint Competition with Polarized Agents AAAI 2025 Private Mechanism Design via Quantile Estimation ICLR 2025 Proportionally Fair Makespan Approximation AAAI 2025 Public Signaling in Markets with Information Asymmetry Using a Limited Number of Signals IJCAI 2025 Quantifying the Self-Interest Level of Markov Social Dilemmas IJCAI 2025 Replication-proof Bandit Mechanism Design with Bayesian Agents AAAI 2025 Responsibility Gap in Collective Decision Making IJCAI 2025 Robust Performance Incentivizing Algorithms for Multi-Armed Bandits with Strategic Agents AAAI 2025 Smart Contracts for Trustless Sampling of Correlated Equilibria IJCAI 2025