mechanism design

Maximizing Nash Social Welfare under Two-Sided Preferences AAAI 2024 Mechanism design augmented with output advice NeurIPS 2024 Mechanisms That Play a Game, Not Toss a Coin IJCAI 2024 Multivariate Analysis and Structural Restrictions in Computational Social Choice IJCAI 2024 Non-excludable Bilateral Trade between Groups AAAI 2024 Online Information Acquisition: Hiring Multiple Agents ICLR 2024 On Optimal Tradeoffs between EFX and Nash Welfare AAAI 2024 On the Capacitated Facility Location Problem with Scarce Resources UAI 2024 Pay to (Not) Play: Monetizing Impatience in Mobile Games AAAI 2024 Peer Neighborhood Mechanisms: A Framework for Mechanism Generalization AAAI 2024 Project-Fair and Truthful Mechanisms for Budget Aggregation AAAI 2024 Randomized Strategic Facility Location with Predictions NeurIPS 2024 Randomized Truthful Auctions with Learning Agents NeurIPS 2024 Recommender Ecosystems: A Mechanism Design Perspective on Holistic Modeling and Optimization AAAI 2024 Regret Analysis of Bilateral Trade with a Smoothed Adversary JMLR 2024 Scalable Mechanism Design for Multi-Agent Path Finding IJCAI 2024 Strategic Aspects of Stable Matching Markets: A Survey IJCAI 2024 Strategic Linear Contextual Bandits NeurIPS 2024 Strategyproof Mechanisms for Group-Fair Obnoxious Facility Location Problems AAAI 2024 Towards a More Burkean Approach to Computational Social Choice AAAI 2024 Truthful High Dimensional Sparse Linear Regression NeurIPS 2024 Unravelling in Collaborative Learning NeurIPS 2024 Worst-Case VCG Redistribution Mechanism Design Based on the Lottery Ticket Hypothesis AAAI 2024 A Framework for Participatory Budgeting with Resource Pooling IJCAI 2023 A Scalable Neural Network for DSIC Affine Maximizer Auction Design NeurIPS 2023