mechanism design

Strategyproof Matching of Roommates and Rooms AAAI 2025 Welfare-Optimal Serial Dictatorships Have Polynomial Query Complexity AAAI 2025 Almost Envy-Free Allocations of Indivisible Goods or Chores with Entitlements AAAI 2024 Altruism in Facility Location Problems AAAI 2024 Autobidder's Dilemma: Why More Sophisticated Autobidders Lead to Worse Auction Efficiency NeurIPS 2024 Automated Design of Affine Maximizer Mechanisms in Dynamic Settings AAAI 2024 Bandits Meet Mechanism Design to Combat Clickbait in Online Recommendation ICLR 2024 Bias Detection via Signaling NeurIPS 2024 Budget Feasible Mechanisms: A Survey IJCAI 2024 Carbon Market Simulation with Adaptive Mechanism Design IJCAI 2024 Carrot and Stick: Eliciting Comparison Data and Beyond NeurIPS 2024 Contextual Bilevel Reinforcement Learning for Incentive Alignment NeurIPS 2024 Double Auction on Diffusion Network AAAI 2024 Eliciting Honest Information from Authors Using Sequential Review AAAI 2024 Enhancing the Efficiency of Altruism and Taxes in Affine Congestion Games through Signalling AAAI 2024 Facility Location Problems with Capacity Constraints: Two Facilities and Beyond IJCAI 2024 FACT or Fiction: Can Truthful Mechanisms Eliminate Federated Free Riding? NeurIPS 2024 Fair Allocation of Items in Multiple Regions AAAI 2024 Getting More by Knowing Less: Bayesian Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Fair Division IJCAI 2024 Improved Metric Distortion via Threshold Approvals AAAI 2024 Information Design for Congestion Games with Unknown Demand AAAI 2024 Learning Coalition Structures with Games AAAI 2024 Learning in Online Principal-Agent Interactions: The Power of Menus AAAI 2024 Learning Optimal Contracts: How to Exploit Small Action Spaces ICLR 2024 MAC Advice for facility location mechanism design NeurIPS 2024