mechanism design

Auto-bidding with Budget and ROI Constrained Buyers IJCAI 2023 Bayesian Optimization-Based Combinatorial Assignment AAAI 2023 Bicriteria Multidimensional Mechanism Design with Side Information NeurIPS 2023 Collusion-Proof and Sybil-Proof Reward Mechanisms for Query Incentive Networks AAAI 2023 Combinatorial Civic Crowdfunding with Budgeted Agents: Welfare Optimality at Equilibrium and Optimal Deviation AAAI 2023 Computing Optimal Equilibria and Mechanisms via Learning in Zero-Sum Extensive-Form Games NeurIPS 2023 Differentially Private Condorcet Voting AAAI 2023 Differentially Private Fair Division AAAI 2023 Enhancing Smart, Sustainable Mobility with Game Theory and Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning With Applications to Ridesharing AAAI 2023 Facility Location Games with Entrance Fees AAAI 2023 From Monopoly to Competition: Optimal Contests Prevail AAAI 2023 Game Implementation: What Are the Obstructions? AAAI 2023 Improved Online Learning Algorithms for CTR Prediction in Ad Auctions ICML 2023 Incentive-aware Contextual Pricing with Non-parametric Market Noise AISTATS 2023 Incentive-Compatible Selection for One or Two Influentials IJCAI 2023 Incentives in Federated Learning: Equilibria, Dynamics, and Mechanisms for Welfare Maximization NeurIPS 2023 Incentivising Diffusion while Preserving Differential Privacy UAI 2023 Incentivizing Honesty among Competitors in Collaborative Learning and Optimization NeurIPS 2023 Learning Efficient Truthful Mechanisms for Trading Networks IJCAI 2023 Mechanism Design for Collaborative Normal Mean Estimation NeurIPS 2023 Moral Machine or Tyranny of the Majority? AAAI 2023 Multi-Stage Facility Location Problems with Transient Agents AAAI 2023 Multi-Unit Auctions for Allocating Chance-Constrained Resources AAAI 2023 Non-Obvious Manipulability in Extensive-Form Mechanisms: The Revelation Principle for Single-Parameter Agents IJCAI 2023 Online Mechanism Design for Information Acquisition ICML 2023