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mechanism design

340 papers

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Co-occurring keywords

game theory (854) incentive compatibility (90) approximation algorithm (630) multi-agent system (1819) truthful mechanism (31) revenue optimization (63) social welfare (86) resource allocation (251) facility location (61) auction theory (41)

Papers

Incentive-Compatible Selection for One or Two Influentials IJCAI 2023
A Framework for Participatory Budgeting with Resource Pooling IJCAI 2023
Moral Machine or Tyranny of the Majority? AAAI 2023
Socially Optimal Non-discriminatory Restrictions for Continuous-Action Games AAAI 2023
Bicriteria Multidimensional Mechanism Design with Side Information NIPS 2023
Combinatorial Civic Crowdfunding with Budgeted Agents: Welfare Optimality at Equilibrium and Optimal Deviation AAAI 2023
Enhancing Smart, Sustainable Mobility with Game Theory and Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning With Applications to Ridesharing AAAI 2023
Mechanism Design for Collaborative Normal Mean Estimation NIPS 2023
Task Allocation on Networks with Execution Uncertainty (Extended Abstract)∗ IJCAI 2023
From Monopoly to Competition: Optimal Contests Prevail AAAI 2023
Rethinking Incentives in Recommender Systems: Are Monotone Rewards Always Beneficial? NIPS 2023
Differentially Private Condorcet Voting AAAI 2023
Participatory Budgeting Designs for the Real World AAAI 2023
Incentive-aware Contextual Pricing with Non-parametric Market Noise AISTATS 2023
Outsourcing Adjudication to Strategic Jurors IJCAI 2023
When Congestion Games Meet Mobile Crowdsourcing: Selective Information Disclosure AAAI 2023
Incentivizing Honesty among Competitors in Collaborative Learning and Optimization NIPS 2023
Truthful Auctions for Automated Bidding in Online Advertising IJCAI 2023
Differentially Private Fair Division AAAI 2023
Learning Efficient Truthful Mechanisms for Trading Networks IJCAI 2023
Auto-bidding with Budget and ROI Constrained Buyers IJCAI 2023
Strategic Facility Location with Clients That Minimize Total Waiting Time AAAI 2023
Multi-Stage Facility Location Problems with Transient Agents AAAI 2023
Non-Obvious Manipulability in Extensive-Form Mechanisms: The Revelation Principle for Single-Parameter Agents IJCAI 2023
Refined Mechanism Design for Approximately Structured Priors via Active Regression NIPS 2023