mechanism design

On the Robustness of Mechanism Design under Total Variation Distance NeurIPS 2023 Optimal Scoring Rules for Multi-dimensional Effort COLT 2023 Outsourcing Adjudication to Strategic Jurors IJCAI 2023 Participatory Budgeting Designs for the Real World AAAI 2023 Principal-Agent Boolean Games IJCAI 2023 Privacy-Aware Compression for Federated Learning Through Numerical Mechanism Design ICML 2023 Random Assignment of Indivisible Goods under Constraints IJCAI 2023 Refined Mechanism Design for Approximately Structured Priors via Active Regression NeurIPS 2023 Rethinking Incentives in Recommender Systems: Are Monotone Rewards Always Beneficial? NeurIPS 2023 Revenue Maximization Mechanisms for an Uninformed Mediator with Communication Abilities IJCAI 2023 Socially Optimal Non-discriminatory Restrictions for Continuous-Action Games AAAI 2023 Strategic Facility Location with Clients That Minimize Total Waiting Time AAAI 2023 Task Allocation on Networks with Execution Uncertainty (Extended Abstract)∗ IJCAI 2023 Triple Eagle: Simple, Fast and Practical Budget-Feasible Mechanisms NeurIPS 2023 Truthful Auctions for Automated Bidding in Online Advertising IJCAI 2023 Truthful Mechanisms for Steiner Tree Problems AAAI 2023 Truthful Self-Play ICLR 2023 Utility Maximizer or Value Maximizer: Mechanism Design for Mixed Bidders in Online Advertising AAAI 2023 VCG Mechanism Design with Unknown Agent Values under Stochastic Bandit Feedback JMLR 2023 When Congestion Games Meet Mobile Crowdsourcing: Selective Information Disclosure AAAI 2023 A Context-Integrated Transformer-Based Neural Network for Auction Design ICML 2022 An α-regret analysis of Adversarial Bilateral Trade NeurIPS 2022 An Algorithmic Introduction to Savings Circles AAAI 2022 Analyzing and Designing Strategic Environments in Social Domains IJCAI 2022 An EF2X Allocation Protocol for Restricted Additive Valuations IJCAI 2022