mechanism design

Automated Synthesis of Mechanisms IJCAI 2022 Bayesian Persuasion in Sequential Decision-Making AAAI 2022 Bridging Central and Local Differential Privacy in Data Acquisition Mechanisms NeurIPS 2022 Can Buyers Reveal for a Better Deal? IJCAI 2022 Characterization of Incentive Compatibility of an Ex-ante Constrained Player AAAI 2022 Contests to Incentivize a Target Group IJCAI 2022 Diffusion Incentives in Cooperative Games IJCAI 2022 Don't Roll the Dice, Ask Twice: The Two-Query Distortion of Matching Problems and Beyond NeurIPS 2022 Efficiency of Ad Auctions with Price Displaying AAAI 2022 Efficient Resource Allocation with Secretive Agents IJCAI 2022 Fair and Efficient Allocations Without Obvious Manipulations NeurIPS 2022 Fair and Truthful Giveaway Lotteries AAAI 2022 Fair Equilibria in Sponsored Search Auctions: The Advertisers’ Perspective IJCAI 2022 Fair, Individually Rational and Cheap Adjustment IJCAI 2022 Heterogeneous Facility Location with Limited Resources AAAI 2022 I Will Have Order! Optimizing Orders for Fair Reviewer Assignment IJCAI 2022 Learning Revenue-Maximizing Auctions With Differentiable Matching AISTATS 2022 Market Design for Drone Traffic Management AAAI 2022 Maximizing Revenue under Market Shrinkage and Market Uncertainty NeurIPS 2022 Mechanism Design Powered by Social Interactions: A Call to Arms IJCAI 2022 Mechanism Design with Predictions IJCAI 2022 Multi-Unit Auction in Social Networks with Budgets AAAI 2022 On Discrete Truthful Heterogeneous Two-Facility Location IJCAI 2022 On Infinite Separations Between Simple and Optimal Mechanisms NeurIPS 2022 Online Allocation and Learning in the Presence of Strategic Agents NeurIPS 2022