truthful mechanism

Designing Truthful Mechanisms for Asymptotic Fair Division AAAI 2026 Discrete Budget Aggregation: Truthfulness and Proportionality IJCAI 2025 Welfare-Optimal Serial Dictatorships Have Polynomial Query Complexity AAAI 2025 Automated Design of Affine Maximizer Mechanisms in Dynamic Settings AAAI 2024 FACT or Fiction: Can Truthful Mechanisms Eliminate Federated Free Riding? NeurIPS 2024 Non-excludable Bilateral Trade between Groups AAAI 2024 On the Capacitated Facility Location Problem with Scarce Resources UAI 2024 On the price of exact truthfulness in incentive-compatible online learning with bandit feedback: a regret lower bound for WSU-UX AISTATS 2024 Plant-and-Steal: Truthful Fair Allocations via Predictions NeurIPS 2024 Project-Fair and Truthful Mechanisms for Budget Aggregation AAAI 2024 Randomized Strategic Facility Location with Predictions NeurIPS 2024 Truthful Interval Covering IJCAI 2024 Learning Efficient Truthful Mechanisms for Trading Networks IJCAI 2023 Truthful Fair Mechanisms for Allocating Mixed Divisible and Indivisible Goods IJCAI 2023 Truthful Mechanisms for Steiner Tree Problems AAAI 2023 Truthful Aggregation of Budget Proposals with Proportionality Guarantees AAAI 2022 Truthful and Fair Mechanisms for Matroid-Rank Valuations AAAI 2022 Truthful Cake Sharing AAAI 2022 A Polynomial-time, Truthful, Individually Rational and Budget Balanced Ridesharing Mechanism IJCAI 2021 Automated Mechanism Design for Classification with Partial Verification AAAI 2021 Budget-feasible Mechanisms for Representing Groups of Agents Proportionally IJCAI 2021 Efficient Truthful Scheduling and Resource Allocation through Monitoring AAAI 2021 Fair and Truthful Mechanisms for Dichotomous Valuations AAAI 2021 Incentivizing Truthfulness Through Audits in Strategic Classification AAAI 2021 Learning Within an Instance for Designing High-Revenue Combinatorial Auctions IJCAI 2021