mechanism design

Optimal Anonymous Independent Reward Scheme Design IJCAI 2022 Planning with Participation Constraints AAAI 2022 Posted Pricing and Dynamic Prior-independent Mechanisms with Value Maximizers NeurIPS 2022 Public Signaling in Bayesian Ad Auctions IJCAI 2022 Random Rank: The One and Only Strategyproof and Proportionally Fair Randomized Facility Location Mechanism NeurIPS 2022 Selling Data To a Machine Learner: Pricing via Costly Signaling ICML 2022 Sequential Blocked Matching AAAI 2022 Simple Mechanisms for Welfare Maximization in Rich Advertising Auctions NeurIPS 2022 Strategy Proof Mechanisms for Facility Location with Capacity Limits IJCAI 2022 Strategyproof Mechanisms for Group-Fair Facility Location Problems IJCAI 2022 Strictly Proper Contract Functions Can Be Arbitrage-Free AAAI 2022 The Power of Media Agencies in Ad Auctions: Improving Utility through Coordinated Bidding IJCAI 2022 Truthful Aggregation of Budget Proposals with Proportionality Guarantees AAAI 2022 Truthful and Fair Mechanisms for Matroid-Rank Valuations AAAI 2022 Truthful Cake Sharing AAAI 2022 Two for One & One for All: Two-Sided Manipulation in Matching Markets IJCAI 2022 Two-Price Equilibrium AAAI 2022 Two-Sided Matching over Social Networks IJCAI 2022 Accomplice Manipulation of the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm IJCAI 2021 A Market-Inspired Bidding Scheme for Peer Review Paper Assignment AAAI 2021 A Neural Network Auction For Group Decision Making Over a Continuous Space IJCAI 2021 A Permutation-Equivariant Neural Network Architecture For Auction Design AAAI 2021 A Polynomial-time, Truthful, Individually Rational and Budget Balanced Ridesharing Mechanism IJCAI 2021 Auction Learning as a Two-Player Game ICLR 2021 Automated Mechanism Design for Classification with Partial Verification AAAI 2021