mechanism design

Budget-feasible Mechanisms for Representing Groups of Agents Proportionally IJCAI 2021 Budget Feasible Mechanisms Over Graphs AAAI 2021 Cooperation in Threshold Public Projects with Binary Actions IJCAI 2021 Counterbalancing Learning and Strategic Incentives in Allocation Markets NeurIPS 2021 Dominant Resource Fairness with Meta-Types IJCAI 2021 Emerging Methods of Auction Design in Social Networks IJCAI 2021 Fair and Truthful Mechanisms for Dichotomous Valuations AAAI 2021 Generalizing Complex Hypotheses on Product Distributions: Auctions, Prophet Inequalities, and Pandora’s Problem COLT 2021 Incentivizing Compliance with Algorithmic Instruments ICML 2021 Incentivizing Truthfulness Through Audits in Strategic Classification AAAI 2021 Learning Optimal Auctions with Correlated Valuations from Samples ICML 2021 Learning Within an Instance for Designing High-Revenue Combinatorial Auctions IJCAI 2021 Mechanism Design for Facility Location Problems: A Survey IJCAI 2021 Online Posted Pricing with Unknown Time-Discounted Valuations AAAI 2021 PoA of Simple Auctions with Interdependent Values AAAI 2021 Prior-independent Dynamic Auctions for a Value-maximizing Buyer NeurIPS 2021 Reaping the Benefits of Bundling under High Production Costs AISTATS 2021 Reinforcement Learning of Sequential Price Mechanisms AAAI 2021 Revenue maximization via machine learning with noisy data NeurIPS 2021 Right Decisions from Wrong Predictions: A Mechanism Design Alternative to Individual Calibration AISTATS 2021 Robust Learning of Optimal Auctions NeurIPS 2021 Sample Elicitation AISTATS 2021 School Choice with Flexible Diversity Goals and Specialized Seats IJCAI 2021 Shortlisting Rules and Incentives in an End-to-End Model for Participatory Budgeting IJCAI 2021 Simultaneous 2nd Price Item Auctions with No-Underbidding AAAI 2021