conftrace_

mechanism design

340 papers

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Co-occurring keywords

game theory (854) incentive compatibility (90) approximation algorithm (630) multi-agent system (1819) truthful mechanism (31) revenue optimization (63) social welfare (86) resource allocation (251) facility location (61) auction theory (41)

Papers

Budgeted Facility Location Games with Strategic Facilities IJCAI 2020
Deep Learning—Powered Iterative Combinatorial Auctions AAAI 2020
Multiagent Evaluation Mechanisms AAAI 2020
Sybil-proof Answer Querying Mechanism IJCAI 2020
Keeping Your Friends Close: Land Allocation with Friends IJCAI 2020
Decentralized Reinforcement Learning: Global Decision-Making via Local Economic Transactions ICML 2020
Participatory Budgeting with Project Interactions IJCAI 2020
Incentive-Compatible Classification AAAI 2020
Limitations of Incentive Compatibility on Discrete Type Spaces AAAI 2020
Peeking Behind the Ordinal Curtain: Improving Distortion via Cardinal Queries AAAI 2020
Mechanism Design with Predicted Task Revenue for Bike Sharing Systems AAAI 2020
VCG under Sybil (False-Name) Attacks - A Bayesian Analysis AAAI 2020
Fair Division Through Information Withholding AAAI 2020
Information Elicitation Mechanisms for Statistical Estimation AAAI 2020
The Surprising Power of Hiding Information in Facility Location AAAI 2020
Multi-Type Resource Allocation with Partial Preferences AAAI 2020
Optimal Approximation - Smoothness Tradeoffs for Soft-Max Functions NIPS 2020
A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Empirical Revenue Maximization Algorithm with Endogenous Sampling NIPS 2020
Truthful Data Acquisition via Peer Prediction NIPS 2020
Certifying Strategyproof Auction Networks NIPS 2020
Facility Location Problem with Capacity Constraints: Algorithmic and Mechanism Design Perspectives AAAI 2020
Swap Stability in Schelling Games on Graphs AAAI 2020
Incentivizing Evaluation with Peer Prediction and Limited Access to Ground Truth (Extended Abstract) IJCAI 2020
PeerNomination: Relaxing Exactness for Increased Accuracy in Peer Selection IJCAI 2020
Efficient Algorithms for Learning Revenue-Maximizing Two-Part Tariffs IJCAI 2020