mechanism design

A Game-Theoretic Analysis of the Empirical Revenue Maximization Algorithm with Endogenous Sampling NeurIPS 2020 A Simple, Fast, and Safe Mediator for Congestion Management AAAI 2020 Bounded Incentives in Manipulating the Probabilistic Serial Rule AAAI 2020 Budgeted Facility Location Games with Strategic Facilities IJCAI 2020 Certifying Strategyproof Auction Networks NeurIPS 2020 Collective Decision Making under Incomplete Knowledge: Possible and Necessary Solutions IJCAI 2020 Competition Among Contests: a Safety Level Analysis IJCAI 2020 Computational Aspects of Conditional Minisum Approval Voting in Elections with Interdependent Issues IJCAI 2020 Decentralized Reinforcement Learning: Global Decision-Making via Local Economic Transactions ICML 2020 Deep Learning—Powered Iterative Combinatorial Auctions AAAI 2020 Efficient Algorithms for Learning Revenue-Maximizing Two-Part Tariffs IJCAI 2020 Facility Location Problem with Capacity Constraints: Algorithmic and Mechanism Design Perspectives AAAI 2020 Fair Division Through Information Withholding AAAI 2020 Incentive-Compatible Classification AAAI 2020 Incentivizing Evaluation with Peer Prediction and Limited Access to Ground Truth (Extended Abstract) IJCAI 2020 Information Elicitation Mechanisms for Statistical Estimation AAAI 2020 Keeping Your Friends Close: Land Allocation with Friends IJCAI 2020 Limitations of Incentive Compatibility on Discrete Type Spaces AAAI 2020 Maximizing Welfare with Incentive-Aware Evaluation Mechanisms IJCAI 2020 Mechanism Design for School Choice with Soft Diversity Constraints IJCAI 2020 Mechanism Design with Predicted Task Revenue for Bike Sharing Systems AAAI 2020 Mechanism Design with Uncertainty IJCAI 2020 Mitigating Manipulation in Peer Review via Randomized Reviewer Assignments NeurIPS 2020 Multiagent Evaluation Mechanisms AAAI 2020 Multi-Type Resource Allocation with Partial Preferences AAAI 2020