conftrace_

mechanism design

340 papers

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Co-occurring keywords

game theory (854) incentive compatibility (90) approximation algorithm (630) multi-agent system (1819) truthful mechanism (31) revenue optimization (63) social welfare (86) resource allocation (251) facility location (61) auction theory (41)

Papers

Maximizing Welfare with Incentive-Aware Evaluation Mechanisms IJCAI 2020
Mechanism Design for School Choice with Soft Diversity Constraints IJCAI 2020
Optimal Auction Based Automated Negotiation in Realistic Decentralised Market Environments AAAI 2020
Strategy-Proof and Non-Wasteful Multi-Unit Auction via Social Network AAAI 2020
Competition Among Contests: a Safety Level Analysis IJCAI 2020
Mechanism Design with Uncertainty IJCAI 2020
Peer-Prediction in the Presence of Outcome Dependent Lying Incentives IJCAI 2020
Selling Data at an Auction under Privacy Constraints UAI 2020
Robust Stackelberg buyers in repeated auctions AISTATS 2020
Partners in Crime: Manipulating the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm through an Accomplice AAAI 2019
Graphical One-Sided Markets IJCAI 2019
An Asymptotically Optimal VCG Redistribution Mechanism for the Public Project Problem IJCAI 2019
Empirical Mechanism Design: Designing Mechanisms from Data UAI 2019
Optimal Auctions through Deep Learning ICML 2019
You Get What You Share: Incentives for a Sharing Economy AAAI 2019
On the Efficiency and Equilibria of Rich Ads IJCAI 2019
Civic Crowdfunding for Agents with Negative Valuations and Agents with Asymmetric Beliefs IJCAI 2019
Making Money from What You Know - How to Sell Information? AAAI 2019
Pareto Efficient Auctions with Interest Rates AAAI 2019
A Bridge between Liquid and Social Welfare in Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Bidders AAAI 2019
Sybil-Resilient Reality-Aware Social Choice IJCAI 2019
Learning Auctions with Robust Incentive Guarantees NIPS 2019
When Samples Are Strategically Selected ICML 2019
On Strategyproof Conference Peer Review IJCAI 2019
Optimal Dynamic Auctions Are Virtual Welfare Maximizers AAAI 2019