mechanism design

Online Revenue Maximization for Server Pricing IJCAI 2020 Optimal Approximation - Smoothness Tradeoffs for Soft-Max Functions NeurIPS 2020 Optimal Auction Based Automated Negotiation in Realistic Decentralised Market Environments AAAI 2020 Participatory Budgeting with Project Interactions IJCAI 2020 Peeking Behind the Ordinal Curtain: Improving Distortion via Cardinal Queries AAAI 2020 PeerNomination: Relaxing Exactness for Increased Accuracy in Peer Selection IJCAI 2020 Peer-Prediction in the Presence of Outcome Dependent Lying Incentives IJCAI 2020 Preventing Arbitrage from Collusion When Eliciting Probabilities AAAI 2020 Prophet Inequalities for Bayesian Persuasion IJCAI 2020 Reinforcement Mechanism Design: With Applications to Dynamic Pricing in Sponsored Search Auctions AAAI 2020 Robust Stackelberg buyers in repeated auctions AISTATS 2020 Selling Data at an Auction under Privacy Constraints UAI 2020 Strategy-Proof and Non-Wasteful Multi-Unit Auction via Social Network AAAI 2020 Strategyproof Mean Estimation from Multiple-Choice Questions ICML 2020 Strongly Budget Balanced Auctions for Multi-Sided Markets AAAI 2020 Swap Stability in Schelling Games on Graphs AAAI 2020 Sybil-proof Answer Querying Mechanism IJCAI 2020 The Surprising Power of Hiding Information in Facility Location AAAI 2020 Truthful Data Acquisition via Peer Prediction NeurIPS 2020 VCG under Sybil (False-Name) Attacks - A Bayesian Analysis AAAI 2020 A Bridge between Liquid and Social Welfare in Combinatorial Auctions with Submodular Bidders AAAI 2019 A Framework for Approval-Based Budgeting Methods AAAI 2019 An Asymptotically Optimal VCG Redistribution Mechanism for the Public Project Problem IJCAI 2019 Approximately Maximizing the Broker's Profit in a Two-sided Market IJCAI 2019 A Robust Non-Clairvoyant Dynamic Mechanism for Contextual Auctions NeurIPS 2019