mechanism design

Civic Crowdfunding for Agents with Negative Valuations and Agents with Asymmetric Beliefs IJCAI 2019 Dynamic Incentive-Aware Learning: Robust Pricing in Contextual Auctions NeurIPS 2019 Empirical Mechanism Design: Designing Mechanisms from Data UAI 2019 Fair and Efficient Memory Sharing: Confronting Free Riders AAAI 2019 From Recommendation Systems to Facility Location Games AAAI 2019 Graphical One-Sided Markets IJCAI 2019 Learning Auctions with Robust Incentive Guarantees NeurIPS 2019 Making Money from What You Know - How to Sell Information? AAAI 2019 Mechanism Design for Multi-Type Housing Markets with Acceptable Bundles AAAI 2019 Multi-Unit Bilateral Trade AAAI 2019 Multi-Winner Contests for Strategic Diffusion in Social Networks AAAI 2019 On Strategyproof Conference Peer Review IJCAI 2019 On the Efficiency and Equilibria of Rich Ads IJCAI 2019 On the Problem of Assigning PhD Grants IJCAI 2019 Optimal Auctions through Deep Learning ICML 2019 Optimal Dynamic Auctions Are Virtual Welfare Maximizers AAAI 2019 Pareto Efficient Auctions with Interest Rates AAAI 2019 Partial Verification as a Substitute for Money AAAI 2019 Partners in Crime: Manipulating the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm through an Accomplice AAAI 2019 Prior-Free Dynamic Auctions with Low Regret Buyers NeurIPS 2019 Random Dictators with a Random Referee: Constant Sample Complexity Mechanisms for Social Choice AAAI 2019 Randomized Wagering Mechanisms AAAI 2019 Ridesharing with Driver Location Preferences IJCAI 2019 Sybil-Resilient Reality-Aware Social Choice IJCAI 2019 When Samples Are Strategically Selected ICML 2019