mechanism design

Cake Cutting: Envy and Truth IJCAI 2017 Contest Design with Uncertain Performance and Costly Participation IJCAI 2017 Contract Design for Energy Demand Response IJCAI 2017 Deterministic, Strategyproof, and Fair Cake Cutting IJCAI 2017 Dynamic Revenue Sharing NeurIPS 2017 Efficient Mechanism Design for Online Scheduling (Extended Abstract) IJCAI 2017 Mechanism Design for Strategic Project Scheduling IJCAI 2017 Mechanisms for Online Organ Matching IJCAI 2017 Near-Feasible Stable Matchings with Budget Constraints IJCAI 2017 Optimal Posted-Price Mechanism in Microtask Crowdsourcing IJCAI 2017 Posted Pricing sans Discrimination IJCAI 2017 Reinforcement mechanism design IJCAI 2017 Avoiding Imposters and Delinquents: Adversarial Crowdsourcing and Peer Prediction NeurIPS 2016 No Oops, You Won’t Do It Again: Mechanisms for Self-correction in Crowdsourcing ICML 2016 Provably manipulation-resistant reputation systems COLT 2016 A Market Framework for Eliciting Private Data NeurIPS 2015 Approval Voting and Incentives in Crowdsourcing ICML 2015 Double or Nothing: Multiplicative Incentive Mechanisms for Crowdsourcing NeurIPS 2015 On the Pseudo-Dimension of Nearly Optimal Auctions NeurIPS 2015 Optimum Statistical Estimation with Strategic Data Sources COLT 2015 Revenue Optimization against Strategic Buyers NeurIPS 2015 Truthful Linear Regression COLT 2015 Optimal Regret Minimization in Posted-Price Auctions with Strategic Buyers NeurIPS 2014 Repeated Contextual Auctions with Strategic Buyers NeurIPS 2014 Learning Prices for Repeated Auctions with Strategic Buyers NeurIPS 2013