mechanism design

You Get What You Share: Incentives for a Sharing Economy AAAI 2019 A Cloaking Mechanism to Mitigate Market Manipulation IJCAI 2018 A Game-Theoretic Approach to Recommendation Systems with Strategic Content Providers NeurIPS 2018 An Axiomatic View of the Parimutuel Consensus Mechanism IJCAI 2018 Bounded-Loss Private Prediction Markets NeurIPS 2018 Budget-feasible Procurement Mechanisms in Two-sided Markets IJCAI 2018 Combinatorial Auctions via Machine Learning-based Preference Elicitation IJCAI 2018 Customer Sharing in Economic Networks with Costs IJCAI 2018 Deep Learning for Multi-Facility Location Mechanism Design IJCAI 2018 Double Auctions in Markets for Multiple Kinds of Goods IJCAI 2018 Efficient Mechanisms for Peer Grading and Dueling Bandits ACML 2018 Ex-post IR Dynamic Auctions with Cost-per-Action Payments IJCAI 2018 Facility Reallocation on the Line IJCAI 2018 Incentive-Compatible Mechanisms for Norm Monitoring in Open Multi-Agent Systems (Extended Abstract) IJCAI 2018 Inference Aided Reinforcement Learning for Incentive Mechanism Design in Crowdsourcing NeurIPS 2018 Leadership in Singleton Congestion Games IJCAI 2018 Negotiation Strategies for Agents with Ordinal Preferences IJCAI 2018 Non-decreasing Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions IJCAI 2018 On Fair Price Discrimination in Multi-Unit Markets IJCAI 2018 Online Pricing for Revenue Maximization with Unknown Time Discounting Valuations IJCAI 2018 Optimal Multi-Attribute Decision Making in Social Choice Problems IJCAI 2018 Probabilistic Verification for Obviously Strategyproof Mechanisms IJCAI 2018 Tractable (Simple) Contests IJCAI 2018 Traffic Light Scheduling, Value of Time, and Incentives IJCAI 2018 Truthful Fair Division without Free Disposal IJCAI 2018