Game Theory

Abstractions in Causal Models and Game Structures CLeaR 2026 Achieving Alignment Through Adaptive Play: Helping Optimize Objectives Without Observing Them UAI 2026 Approximating Nash Equilibria in Finite-Horizon Multi-Adversarial Team Markov Games UAI 2026 A Reinforcement Learning Approach in Multi-Phase Second-Price Auction Design JMLR 2026 A Symplectic Analysis of Alternating Mirror Descent JMLR 2026 Building a Bridge Between the Shapley Value, Prime Implicants and Counterfactual Explanations: a Theoretical Analysis UAI 2026 Causal Foundations of Collective Agency CLeaR 2026 Computing Exact Nash Equilibria in Graphical Games: A Geometric Approach to Paths, Stars, and Caterpillars UAI 2026 DeltaSHAP: a Shapley Value Framework for Interpreting Political Ambiguity SemEval 2026 Differentially Private Approval-Based Committee Voting UAI 2026 Efficient Decentralized Learning of Generalized Quantal Response Equilibrium UAI 2026 Efficient Opportunistic Approachability ALT 2026 EmoMAS: Emotion-Aware Multi-Agent System for High-Stakes Edge-Deployable Negotiation with Bayesian Orchestration ACL 2026 Equal Opportunity: A Correctness Condition for Ordered Consensus OSDI 2026 Eventually LIL Regret: Almost Sure $\ln\ln T$ Regret for a sub-Gaussian Mixture on Unbounded Data ALT 2026 Finite-Sample Regret Analysis of Nash Q-Learning with Random-Feature Approximation UAI 2026 Generative Gamer: Learning Equilibrium Strategy by LLM-driven Dynamic Deduction ACL 2026 Last-iterate Convergence for Symmetric, General-sum, 2 × 2 Games Under The Exponential Weights Dynamic ALT 2026 MERIT Feedback Elicits Better Bargaining in LLM Negotiators ACL 2026 Multiwinner Voting with Interval Preferences under Incomplete Information UAI 2026 Near Optimal Convergence to Coarse Correlated Equilibrium in General-Sum Markov Games L4DC 2026 Nonlinear Axiomatic Attribution for Cooperative Games UAI 2026 Online Fair Allocation with Demand-Side Time-Dependent Weight UAI 2026 Online Learning for Project Selection in Hedonic Project Games UAI 2026 Optimizing Coordination among Bounded Rational Agents L4DC 2026