2015
NeurIPS
NeurIPS 2015
Is Approval Voting Optimal Given Approval Votes?
Abstract
Some crowdsourcing platforms ask workers to express their opinions by approving a set of k good alternatives. It seems that the only reasonable way to aggregate these k-approval votes is the approval voting rule, which simply counts the number of times each alternative was approved. We challenge this assertion by proposing a probabilistic framework of noisy voting, and asking whether approval voting yields an alternative that is most likely to be the best alternative, given k-approval votes. While the answer is generally positive, our theoretical and empirical results call attention to situations where approval voting is suboptimal.
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The Questioner
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Keyword Pioneer
- voting theory
Authors
Topics
Artificial Intelligence > Core AI > Game AI
Machine Learning > Optimization & Theory > Learning Theory
Machine Learning > Learning Types > Multi-Agent Systems
Artificial Intelligence > Core AI > Game Theory
Machine Learning > Optimization & Theory > Game Theory
Machine Learning > Learning Types > Crowdsourcing